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I. INTRODUCTION
On March 21, 2012, Joseph Odhiambo, a Canadian citizen of
Kenyan descent, was attending an international environmental
conference in the Malian capital of Bamako.1 Earlier that night, the
military seized power from the democratically elected civilian govern-
ment.2 He found himself trapped in his hotel room with no power,
forcing him to turn off his laptop and cell phone in order to conserve
energy and wait for periodic news updates. 3 Supporters of the
military's coup d'6tat had recently occupied the airport which barred
his departure by air and he had neither the mastery of the language
nor the terrain to cross the border into Senegal by land.4 When Joseph
looked outside he could see that the "dark horizon was backlit by
flickers of red, yellow and orange" with the sound of gunfire in the
background.5 He barricaded the door with hotel furniture, which he
knew to be an exercise in futility if armed men truly wanted to gain
entrance. 6 All he could do then was wait for an end to the confusion
and chaos. 7 It was three weeks before Joseph was able to go home.8
Chaos, instability, and other symptoms common to military
coups and armed conflict have been pervasive in the developing world
since the end of World War II.9 During the time immediately after the
war, a large part of U.S. foreign assistance was geared towards
rebuilding Europe and forging valuable alliances for the impending
fight against Communism. 10 Also during that time, many countries in
I Joseph Odhiambo, A First Hand Account of the Beginning of a Military Coup in
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the developing world were becoming independent and, for the most
part, left woefully bereft of infrastructure by their colonizers.11
In 1961, as an effort to substantiate the development of good
governance, "at [President] Kennedy's urging, Congress passed the
Foreign Assistance Act (hereinafter "FAA"), which mandated the
creation of an agency to promote long-term assistance for economic
and social development."12 "The laws governing U.S. obligations when
a military coup occurs provide sparse legal justification for continuing
financial assistance to a country until a democratically elected
government assumes office." 13 USAID was created, by executive order,
alongside the FAA in 1961 as the administrative agency to oversee the
execution of the Act's mandates.14 USAID's objectives have evolved
over the decades from "technical and capital assistance" in the 1960's
to "war and rebuilding" more recently.15
USAID and other administrative agencies are not the only
organs of the United States government that manages foreign aid
disbursements. The State Department governs the administration of a
tremendous amount of foreign aid, including programs that deal with
international narcotics trafficking and fighting the spread of diseases
like HIV/AIDs, etc. 16 Also, the State Department supervises programs
that fall under a more military category, including Foreign Military
Financing ("FMF") and others, most of which are actually overseen by
the Department of Defense, in their execution.
There are three traditional rationales for foreign aid: national
security objectives, commercial interests and humanitarian concerns.17
Foreign aid has been a mechanism to achieve national security objec-
tives for decades, beginning with the Cold War and continuing
through the War on Terror.18 Foreign assistance benefits U.S. commer-
11 Id
12 Id
13 Sahar Aziz, US. Foreign Aid and Morsi's Ouster, MIDDLE EAST INSTITUTE (July 31,
2013), http://www.mei.edu/content/us-foreign-aid-and-morsis-ouster.
14 USAID, supra note 9.
15 Id.
16 Curt Tarnoff & Marian Leonardo Lawson, Foreign Aid: An Introduction into US.
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cial interests by promoting U.S. products and opening new markets to
the global economy through sustainable development. 19 In addition,
humanitarian concerns "drive both short-term assistance in response
to crises and disasters, as well as long-term development assistance
aimed at alleviating poverty, hunger and other forms of humanitarian
suffering.... "20 In 2010, the United States focused $20 billion, or 53% of
all U.S. assistance, to "alleviate human suffering" in impoverished
countries with 12% going towards "military aid."
21, 2 2
It is express in the FAA and subsequent legislation, as well as
executive policy, that aid to a country should be immediately cut off in
the case of a military coup d'6tat of a democratically elected leader.23
This policy is meant to assure that aid is distributed in accordance with
the three rationales mentioned above. When the Egyptian Army issued
a statement giving President Mohammed Morsi, who was democratic-
ally elected a year prior, an ultimatum to vacate the presidency or face
consequences there were conflicting legal and policy implications for
both continuing foreign aid and cutting it off.24 U.S considerations
ranged from the text of the relevant legislation, to broader regional
interests, as well as the Obama Administration's strategic refusal not to
recognize the Egyptian military's actions as a coup.25 Additionally, the
facts on the ground, such as the counter-democratic policies of Morsi
himself and the mass revolts against his administration, played an
important role. 26
This note will examine United States foreign aid practices to
determine whether the continued aid disbursements to the Egyptian
interim government were consistent with U.S. law. Part II will be a
brief analysis of the United States' legal and political relationship to
19Id at3.
20 d
21This statistic may be partially due to the fact that programs such as Foreign Military
Financing, where the U.S. government loans money to foreign governments in order to
buy weapons, is not recorded as "foreign aid," national security related or otherwise.
22 See Tarnoff & Lawson, supra note 16.
23 See Aziz, supra note 13.
24 See id
25 Id.
26 Patrick Kingsley & Martin Chulov, Mohamed Morsi Ousted in Egypt's Second
Revolution in Two Years, THE GuARDiAN (July 3, 2013), available at http://www.
theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/03/mohamed-morsi-egypt-second-revolution.
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Egypt in recent decades and how such ties may have evolved. Part III
will be a legal analysis of United States foreign aid distribution, from
two of the three branches of government, with case examples. 27 This
section will examine the FAA and subsequent legislation; the Depart-
ments of State and Defense as well as USAID and other agencies
involved with aid disbursements; and there will be a legal analysis of
recent cases where foreign aid was or "should have been" cut. Part IV
will analyze how U.S. law governing foreign aid disbursements
applies to current events surrounding the Egyptian military's actions,
comparing and contrasting to the other cases. Further, it will consider
the three rationales for aid disbursement, mentioned in Part I.28 Finally,
Part V will make a final determination of the legality of continued
funding of the Egyptian military under U.S law.
II. UNITED STATES-EGYPT RELATIONS: HISTORY AND ANALYSIS
From the end of the Second World War, the United States'
strategic relationship with Egypt evolved, with historical checkpoints
earmarking when major changes took place. In the years leading up to
their second war with Israel, then Egyptian president Gamal Abdul
Nasser embarked on a campaign of Arab nationalism and defiance of
the West.2 9 Still in need of military support, Nasser went to the Soviet
Union which would define the nature of Egypt's relationship to the
United States for decades.30 Then, in 1979, U.S. President Jimmy Carter
brokered a peace treaty between Israel and Egypt, creating a fragile
peace between the two countries and opening a diplomatic door
between Egypt and the U.S. Further, the War on Terror created a
pressing need for an Arab ally in the region, contributing to Egypt
becoming a top recipient of United States foreign aid.31 In 2011, the
27 The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, 22 U.S.C. §§ 2151-2431 (2012).
28 See Aziz, supra note 13.
29 Israel winning independence, in 1948, was seen as a blow to most Arab countries,
not just the Palestinian people. Tensions did not subside much between that first war
and the second Arab/Israeli War in 1956. It was through rhetoric and policy such as
nationalizing the Suez Canal, a waterway granting European trade access to a large
vortion of Africa that drove the West away from Nasser's corner.
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Arab Spring destabilized the region and since then Egypt has seen one
round of democratic elections, three presidents, and violent protests
from different groups, all seemingly with different agendas. The
United States has had to balance strategic regional interests with
pushing for democratic reform, a task complicated by a volatility that
still grips Egypt.32
Most aid flows to the Egyptian military, the element in the
power structure that keeps peace with Israel, assists in maintaining the
United States' interests in the region, and it currently holds absolute
power.33 Egypt was the recipient of over $1.5 billion in foreign aid in
2012, making it the fifth largest beneficiary of the United States' yearly
aid disbursements. 34 Presently, the Obama administration has
requested $1.55 billion for 2014.35 Moreover, of that figure, approxi-
mately $1.3 billion of the disbursements will be for military aid and a
mere $250 million is for humanitarian purposes. 36
It is estimated that U.S. military aid "covers as much as 80% of
the [Egyptian] Defense Ministry's weapon procurement costs" and
finances many of their "acquisitions, upgrades to existing equipment,
and maintenance contracts." 37 The roughly $1.3 billion in Foreign
Military Financing finds its way into many Egyptian weapons pro-
grams, which keep their military strong and modern.38 Furthermore, it
is not only "government aid" that provides Egypt with the crucial
resources it needs, but also trade. For example, in 2010 Congress
approved a $2.5 billion sale of 20 F-16 "Fighter Falcons," between
Egypt and defense contractor Lockheed Martin.39
32 Israel's peace-treaty with Israel was the first with an Arab country. There is only one
more today with Jordan, brokered by President Clinton approximately 15 years later.
33 Jeremy M. Sharp, Egypt: Background and US. Relations, Congressional Research
Service (2014), available at www.crs.gov.
34 Id.
35 Peter Baker, A Coup? Or Something Else? $1.5 Billion in US. Aid Is on the Line,
N.Y. TIMES (July 4, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/05/world/middleeast/
egypts-arrests-of-islamists-pose-test-to-us-over-military-aid.html?pagewanted=all&
r=1&.
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Democratic and humanitarian interests also play a role in the
decision to fund the Egyptian government. 40 Throughout the 1980's
and 90's USAID funded major infrastructure projects in the industries
of sanitation, education and telecommunication.41 Funding democratic
transition organizations has been a point of contention between the
United States and Egypt since the years of Hosni Mubarak. Still
Congress appropriated funds to Egyptian civil society that were not
subject to approval by Mubarak's government. 42
III. UNITED STATES LAW AND FOREIGN RELATIONS
Foreign aid is a fundamental component of United States
foreign policy, others being the U.S. defense establishment, the diplo-
matic corps, public diplomacy, and trade policy. 43 Title 22 of the
United States Code governs foreign relations and contains exhaustive
statutes, sculpting the legal infrastructure for United States foreign aid
policy. The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 is the "foundational legal
framework" in designing foreign aid programs.44 In addition, there is
extensive subsequent legislation addressing foreign aid. Some provi-
sions are more geographically specific and others are more specific to
the type of aid: military, commercial and/or humanitarian. Further,
Congress supplements the FAA and other relevant law with periodic
appropriations bills that are more reflective of current interests.45
Compared to the construction of a brick home, the FAA would be the
frame and each subsequent bill is a brick. The various departments and
agencies of the Executive branch then become responsible for dis-
charging funds consistent with Congress' appropriations. Determining
whether actions taken in a given case are in accordance with the laws
of Congress requires analysis of the legal principles within the relevant
legislation.
40 Id.
41 See Sharp, supra note 33.
42 Id
43 See Tarnoff & Lawson, supra note 16.
44 22 U.S.C. §§ 2151-2431.
45 See Aziz, supra note 13.
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A. Congress and Foreign Aid
United States law directs foreign aid to assist developing coun-
tries in building long-term democratic institutions and economic
growth, in accordance with U.S. interests. Beginning with the FAA,
these goals are enforced through provisions that condition the fur-
nishing of foreign aid on continued democratic governance and direct
it to be suspended if the "military plays a decisive role" in removing
the "duly elected head of state" from power.46 This concept was
express within the FAA under Section 508 until it was repealed in
1973.47 Still, the notion is implicit within the FAA, embodied within the
object and purpose of the law. Furthermore, Title 22 of the United
States Code is filled to the proverbial brim with statutes that use the
principles of the FAA, and apply them to more specific directives. The
ADVANCE Democracy Act ("ADA"), The Arms Export Control Act
("AECA") and the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009
("EPPA") are three examples of laws that further the object and pur-
pose of the FAA by using similar methods to accomplish shared
goals. 4 8 Perhaps the most profound and modern demonstration of the
FAA's purported objective is the Consolidated Appropriations Bill for
2014.49
Numerous provisions of the FAA obligate foreign assistance to
developing countries.50 The FAA allocates funds for research on the
differing needs of peoples across the developing world; to "use intel-
lectual resources of such countries and areas ... to encourage the dev-
elopment of indigenous institutions...;" and support the civic educa-
tion and training necessary to develop a political infrastructure. 51 The
Act designates certain amounts of funding for each fiscal year to be
held for emergency assistance. 52 It includes the "Enterprise for the
46 See id.
47 d.
48 The ADVANCE Democracy Act, 22 U.S.C. §§ 8201-8262 (2007); The Arms
Export Control Act, 22 U.S.C. §§ 2751-2799(aa); The Enhanced Partnership with
Pakistan Act of 2009 §§ 8401-8442 (2009).
49 H.R. 3547, 113th Cong. (2014).
'o 22 U.S.C. §§2151-2431.
" 22 U.S.C. § 2271 (2012).
52 Essentially this is referring to money to help developing countries rebuild infra-
structure after conflict or natural disaster. 22 U.S.C. § 2346(b) (2012).
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Americas Initiative," which encourages financial investment and
market-oriented reform throughout Latin America and the Carib-
bean.53 And in the interests of national security, the FAA allots money
for counter-terrorism technology to be supplied to our allies,54 along
with military training on how to use defense articles and services
purchased from the United States.55
Section 508's repeal did not leave the Act devoid of means to
limit aid.56 The FAA instructs that no foreign aid is to be disbursed to
recipient governments that do not comply with the object and purpose
of the Act.5 7 Among those ineligible to receive aid are governments
that use funds for paramilitary operations, those that engage the use of
child soldiers, etc.58 More specifically, military assistance programs
must consider whether the contribution is to an arms race, regional
instability or prejudice of "the development of bilateral or multi-lateral
arms control arrangements." 59
Title 22 of the United States Code contains pages of statutes,
which present similar goals as the FAA, only offered in alternative
legislation, often more specific to a purpose and/or region.60 The
Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009 ("EPPA") provides
Pakistan with enough military financing and training so that they are
able to maintain a functional defense establishment and reconstruct
war torn regions of the country. 61 The EPPA also contains a provision
restricting aid if, "the duly elected head of government is deposed by
military coup or decree." 62 The ADVANCE Democracy Act ("ADA")
directs support for ideals such as "to promote the rule of law, build the
capacity of civil society, political parties, and legislatures, improve the
independence of the media and the judiciary, enhance independent
5 22 U.S.C. § 2430.
54 22 U.S.C. § 2349(aa-10) (2012).
22 U.S.C. § 2347(b) (2012).
56 22 U.S.C. §§2151-2431.
57id.
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, 22 U.S.C. § 2370(c-1) (2014).
59 Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, 22 U.S.C. § 2321(d) (2014).
60 22 U.S.C. § 2151 (2014); 22 U.S.C. § 2301 (2014).
6 22 U.S.C. § 8422 (The stated goals here are discerned from the portion of the statute
called the "Sense of Congress", which basically Congress stating its views on the
object and purpose of the statute).
62 22 U.S.C. § 8422(b)(3).
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auditing functions, and advance security sector reform .," among
others. 63 The Arms Export Control Act ("AECA") grants the President
the authority to, "finance the procurement of defense articles, defense
services, and design and construct services by friendly foreign coun-
tries and international organizations...." 64 Foreign military financing,
within the AECA, is limited by provisions which allow the president to
furnish such assistance so long as it comports with United States
interests and world peace.65
The most recent embodiment of United States law on foreign
assistance is "Division K" of the Consolidated Appropriations Bill for
2014.66 Titles III & IV govern "Bilateral Economic Assistance" and
"International Security Assistance" respectively. Furthermore, these
Titles allocate certain amounts of money to specific policy goals. 67 Title
III includes a "Democracy Fund," which sets aside more than $130
million in order to promote the FAA's goal of global development of
democratic institutions.68 Section 7008 of Title IV directs that funds
disbursed under Titles III and IV of the Act will be suspended for any
State where a "duly elected head of government is deposed by military
coup d'6tat or decree or, after the date of enactment of this act, a coup
d'6tat in which the military played a decisive role." 69 It is up to
Executive discretion to decide when democracy has been restored and
foreign assistance can thus continue.70 Moreover, all of this is
instructed under the authority of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.71
The FAA, as well as the 2014 appropriations bill, pledges
billions to global health initiatives, demonstrating the law's commit-
ment to humanitarian causes. The EPPA and the AECA both deal with
Foreign Military Sales and Foreign Military Financing programs in
foreign countries where lack of infrastructure, military or otherwise,
results in a national security threat to the United States. Pakistan, being
the central focus of the EPPA, has an underdeveloped infrastructure
6322 U.S.C. § 8262 (2007).
64 22 U.S.C. § 2763(a) (1996).
6522 U.S.C. §§ 2751-2799(aa).
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and there is plenty of incentive for the U.S. to continue funding. Fur-
ther, the American Enterprise Initiative's attempts to advance market
reforms in the Western Hemisphere addresses commercial interest by
setting out to create a thriving market among the United States'
neighbors within the Americas.
When Section 508 of the FAA was repealed, it made the FAA
more malleable as this section was one of the few that were immune to
Executive discretion. 72 It was a stalwart provision that disincentivized
military recipients of United States foreign aid, of which there are
many, from taking too heavy a hand in the overthrow of democratic-
ally elected leaders.73 Despite the FAA's current malleability, concur-
rent and interchangeable legislation, such as the ADA, EPPA, AECA
strengthen the broader theme of the law. That being United States
foreign aid is meant to develop global democratic governance in a
manner consistent with United States interests. Further, Section 7008 of
the Appropriations Bill clarifies that Section 508's absence still allows
democratic governance to be the linchpin in foreign finance pro-
grams.74 It states in no uncertain terms that aid is to be suspended for
as long as the President judges military rule to last.75
B. Executive Action and Foreign Aid Disbursements
The FAA, alternate legislation, and appropriations bills dating
back decades all charge different departments within the Executive
branch and relevant Administrative Agencies for the responsible
disbursement of United States foreign aid funds. The preponderance of
United States foreign relations legislation allocates funding specifically
in the interest of democracy, conditioning disbursements on main-
tenance of those democratic institutions. The executive, chiefly the
President, the Departments of State and Defense and the relevant
agencies then must execute the laws by disbursing funds towards
countries that are up to their standards. Other departments and initia-
tives are also involved in providing foreign assistance, such as the
72 See Aziz, supra note 13.
73 d.
74 Supra note 49.
75 d.
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Treasury Department and the Millennium Challenge Corporations, but
their role is less expansive.76
Through the authority of the FAA, Section 7008 of the 2014
Consolidated Appropriations Bill grants the President discretion to
choose the suitable time to reinstate suspended aid flows.7 The
President is also responsible for appointing the Secretary of State,
Secretary of Defense, and the Administrator of USAID, all of whom
head the organs of the United States government most responsible for
crafting aid disbursement programs.
As one of the primary sculptors of U.S. foreign policy, the
Department of State is charged with overseeing foreign assistance
programs, which were budgeted $12.03 billion in 2010.78 A great deal
of discretion is allocated to the Secretary of State and the appropriate
Assistant Secretaries to determine the definition "nondemocratic" or
"democratic transition" countries, thus qualifying reformers within the
chosen States for economic assistance.79 It is directly responsible for
"administer [ing] activities dealing with international narcotics control
and law enforcement, terrorism, weapons proliferation, democracy
promotion, non-U.N. peace-keeping operations, refugee relief, and
voluntary support for a range of international organizations such as
UNICEF."80 One of the Department's offices, the Bureau of Political-
Military Affairs, controls policy for a $4.7 billion group of military
related initiatives, including Foreign Military Financing Programs.81 In
2006, the position of "Director of Foreign Assistance" was created in
order to "coordinate foreign assistance programs."82 Additionally, the
State Department participates in joint projects with USAID.83
The Department of Defense also takes an active role in foreign
aid programs from a military standpoint. Their role is mostly to
administer aid based on the policy proffered by the State Depart-
ment,84 under the authority of legislation such as the FAA and
76 See Tarnoff & Lawson, supra note 16.
SH.R. 3547.
See Tarnoff & Lawson, supra note 16.





84 See Tarnoff & Lawson, supra note 16.
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subsequent appropriations bills. "In FY2010, funding for these assis-
tance programs totaled $4.7 billion."85 These programs include the
aforementioned Foreign Military Financing Programs, in addition to
International Military Education and Training and the Pakistan Coun-
terinsurgency Capability Fund.86 Additionally, the Department of
Defense funds programs not considered foreign aid, for nation
building,87 primarily in Afghanistan and Iraq.88
The United States Agency for International Development is the
operative organ of the United States foreign aid apparatus. John F.
Kennedy created USAID in 1961, in order to carry out the executive
function delegated to it by the FAA. 89 USAID is primarily focused on
the humanitarian rationale. In its mission statement it highlights its
two primary goals as, "ending extreme poverty and promoting the
development of resilient democratic society. ... "90 Congress delegates
authority to various agencies, although mostly USAID, in consultation
with the appropriate congressional committees to build on existing
programs for providing assistance. 91 For 2014, the President has
requested $20.4 billion for USAID's budget.92 The budget's stated
intention is to partner with the State Department in order to fund
health initiatives, combat susceptibility to the negative effects of
climate change, fund programs for building democratic institutions
and more.93
C. Case Studies
It is rare that there are clear-cut decisions to be made in most
cases of military coup d'6tats. These decisions are made both from a
legal and geopolitical perspective and the lines blur between the
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kind of aid, military and humanitarian.94 In the case of Mali, where
Joseph Odhiambo had barricaded himself in a hotel room and was
unable to leave for three weeks,95 the United States cut off military aid
immediately after the democratically elected leader was deposed, but
continued to supply humanitarian aid.96 It was a year later that the
State Department announced they were reinstating military support of
the Malian government. 97
1. Niger
In certain cases there is a clear course of action, as with Niger
during the Clinton Administration.98 On January 27, 1996, there was a
military coup, and the democratically elected leaders were forcibly
removed from power.99 The State Department calculated that nearly
$25 million in development and military assistance went to Niger in
the 1995 Fiscal year and proceeded to cancel further disbursements.100
The announcement also noted that the United States not only planned
to cut off direct assistance to Niger but also would stop supporting
international financial programs that provided services to them.101 The
statement does suggest that aid disbursements would restart, pending
the restoration of a legitimate government in Niger. 102
94 See Aziz, supra note 13.
95 Odhiambo, supra note 1.
96 Max Fisher, US. Has a Spotty Record on Law Requiring it to Cut Aid After Coups,
WASHINGTON POST (July 5, 2013 at 1:04 pm), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/
worldviews/wp/2013/07/05/u-s-has-spotty-record-on-law-requiring-it-to-cut-aid-after-
coups/.
97 The United States State Department, US. Relations with Mali (Apr. 30, 2013)
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2828.htm.
98 White House Press Secretary, U.S. Suspends Assistance to Niger Following Military
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2. Algeria
In the early 1990's, Algeria was about to experience what was
supposed to be the first free and fair election in the Arab world.103 The
Islamists parties were polling with very high numbers and likely to
win.104 Then, the military, which had a long-standing power struggle
with the radical Islamists, cancelled elections and took power, driving
the country into a war that would last for the remainder of the
decade.105 It claimed nearly 150,000 lives and can be cited as a source of
sectarian violence that still plagues the country's fragile stability.106
President George H.W. Bush immediately ceased all foreign aid set to
be disbursed in Algeria, pursuant to the Foreign Assistance Act.107 The
decision to apply the FAA was clear because Algeria was deprived of
democratic elections directly by the military. President George W.
Bush later revived the financial relationship between Algeria and the
United States in the wake of the War on Terror,108 the objective being
to create another cooperating government in the region.109 National
security interests were heightened some years had passed since the
worst of the violence, making reinstatement of aid easier to justify
under the terms of the FAA.
3. Pakistan
During the 1990's Nawaz Sharif had been an elected leader of
Pakistan, in varying capacities, numerous times.110 While he was Prime
103 Fisher, supra note 96.
104 See id.
105 Id
106Algeria Profile, BBC NEWS, (Dec. 18, 2013, 11:52), http://www.bbc.com/news/
world-africa- 14118852.
107 See Fisher, supra note 96.
108 Keith Somerville, U.S. Military Aid for Algeria, BBC NEWS (2002), available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/2561163.stm.
109 The first of the rationales for comprehensive foreign aid is national security. This is
not the only case where national security played a part in authorizing continued aid,
however, Pakistan is the only case in this note where Congress authorized a waiver of
the FAA for purely Commercial Interests, as they did in their 2000 bill, reopening
agricultural and commercial trade. See infra Section III(c)(3).
110 Pakistan Profile, BBC NEWS, (June 5, 2013, 11:58), http://www.bbc.com/news/
world- south-asia- 12966786.
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Minister in 1999, the Pakistani military installed Army General Pervez
Musharraf, replacing Sharif and resulting in his exile to Saudi Arabia.111
The Clinton Administration then suspended aid, pursuant to "[p]re-
existing provisions contained within Section 508 of the Foreign
Assistance Act [], which mandated that 'none of the funds appropriated'
for foreign assistance 'shall be obligated or expended to finance directly'
any government 'deposed by military coup or decree."' 112 Section 508
states that aid disbursements must be suspended until a democratic
government is restored.113
Congress authorized President Clinton to restart sending aid to
the government, in the form of agricultural loans and private commer-
cial loans by passing the "FY 2000 Defense Appropriations Act." 114
Essentially this law, specifically Title XI, acted as a waiver of the FAA
for certain types of aid.115 Then, after the attacks on September 11th,
2001, President Bush enacted Title XI for "full waiver authority" in the
national security interests of the United States.116 There was congres-
sional action taken in order to effect President Bush's waiver. 117
4. Honduras
In 2009 Honduras experienced internal conflict that resulted in
both a military coup and the freezing of United States foreign aid
programs pursuant to the FAA.118 The military escorted the President
of Honduras, Manuel Zalaya, to the airport where they forced him to
board a plane to Costa Rica and then named the President of the
111 Id.
112 Colin Cookman & Bill French, The Pakistan Aid Dilemma: Historic Efforts at
Conditionality and Current Disputes Converge in the US. Congress, CENTER FOR
AMERICAN PROGRESS (2011), available at http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/
security/report/2011/12/16/10823/the-pakistan-aid-dilemma/ (Referencing § 508 of the
FAA).
113 Id.
114 See id. (Referencing FY 2000 Defense Appropriations Act (Public Law 106-79)).
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Honduran Congress as the new President of the country.119 Zalaya - a
leftist leader aligned with Hugo Chavez of Venezuela - was
attempting to revise the Honduran Constitution to extend the limit of
one four-year term for the president, a move regarded by many as
illegal.120 President Zalaya was, however, democratically elected. 121
Until this time, the United States and Honduras had a "close
military relationship" and the U.S. kept various bases in Honduras,
mostly for training Honduran soldiers for "counter-narcotics opera-
tions, search and rescue, and disaster relief missions throughout
Central America." 122 In the days immediately preceding the event, as
controversy over this proposed Constitutional referendum ramped up,
U.S. officials began to work to avoid military action.123 Once the matter
exploded, care was taken in the language in order to not specifically
refer to the situation as a coup. 1 24 There was no congressional waiver
of the FAA as there had been in Pakistan. In the end, the Obama
Administration did recognize the military's conduct as a coup, and cut
off $30 billion in aid, which is only part of what Honduras receives.
5. Trends
What is important to understand from these cases are the
trends that exist between the different situations and to determine
when the proper and legal moment is for the United States to freeze
funding. What these four cases, spanning over four presidential
administrations, point out is that:
(1) Congress can authorize waiver, freeing the United
States from legal obligation to halt aid upon the
ousting of a democratically elected leader. This
allows the continued flow of aid in order to
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accomplish U.S. interests, whether they be
National Security or Commercial as in Pakistan,125
or Humanitarian as in Mali. 126
(2) The second main trend coming from these cases is
the language used by officials. In both the case of
HonduraS127 and Egypt1 28 commenters were very
careful to avoid the word "coup", so as not to
invoke the FAA's freeze on financial assistance. 129
(3) Finally, and in accordance with Trend 2, "context
is king." The Honduran Coup is distinctly differ-
ent from the Pakistani one, as there the President
was attempting to force a Constitutional Revision,
one the Supreme Court of the country rejected.130
The facts on the ground become immensely
important to understand the context behind Con-
gressional waiver and/or strategic language.
In Egypt, all three of these factors come into play. The U.S. has
cut off $1.3 billion in military aid but has not cut off $250 million in
humanitarian aid.131 Directly after the military removed Mohammed
Morsi there was no mention of the word, "coup" and there was a
complex series of events leading up to and following Morsi's ousting,
which continue today. 132
125 See Cookman & French, supra note 113.
126 See Fisher, supra note 96.
127 Paul Richter, US. Cuts of $30 Million in Aid to Honduras, Los ANGELES TIMES
(2009), available at http://articles.latimes.com/2009/sep/04/world/fg-us-honduras4.
128 See Aziz, supra note 13.
12922 U.S.C. §§ 2151-2431.
130 See Richter, supra note 125.
131 Jeremy M. Sharp, Egypt in Crisis: Issues for Congress, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH
SERVICE (2013), available at www.crs.gov.
132 Peter Baker, A Coup? Or Something Else? $1.5 Billion in US. Aid is on the Line,
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IV. LEGAL ANALYSIS OF CONTINUED FOREIGN ASSISTANCE TO THE
EGYPTIAN MILITARY
When the Egyptian military removed Mohammed Morsi from
power and replaced him with Judge Adly Monsour of the Supreme
Constitutional Court, Egypt was on track to receive over $1.6 billion of
aid for the year.133 In the most recent Foreign Appropriations bills, the
standard for whether the President and State Department are desig-
nated to suspend aid contains two elements;134 whether the person
removed from power was actually a "democratically elected head of
state" 135 and whether the military played a decisive role in his or her
removal. 136 As with previous foreign aid dilemmas there are a host of
factors to be considered around this test. Then United States' actions
can be analyzed to make a final determination of whether there was a
breach in legal obligation.
A. Whether Morsi Was the Democratically Elected Leader and
Egyptian Military's Decisive Role in His Removal
Elections brought Mohamed Morsi to power on June 24,
2012.137 A closer look at the election itself and the actions of the former
president immediately following them are also important considera-
tions in determining the United States' legal obligation to suspend
foreign aid. This obligation hangs on whether the election that he won
was conducted freely and fairly and whether or not Morsi's actions
after the election were too characteristic of an authoritarian regime.138
133 Susan B. Epstein & Marian Leonardo Lawson & Alex Tiersky, State, Foreign
Operations, and Related Programs: FY2013 Budget and Appropriations,
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE (2012), available at www.crs.gov.
134 Steven Aiello, In Egypt, Coup or Not Coup: the 1.5 Billion Dollar Question,
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Samuel Huntington defines democracy as "a regime in which
political leaders are selected through free and fair elections." 139 The
right to free and fair elections is present throughout an entire body of
international law and "is fast becoming an integral part of the ela-
borately woven human rights fabric." 140 Article twenty-five of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ("ICCPR"), one of
the most paramount and widely ratified human rights treaties,
mentions the right to "vote and be elected at genuine periodic elec-
tions. ... "141 The requisite criteria for free and fair elections are:
"(1) the right of all voters to participate in the electoral
process without hindrance; (2) freedom to campaign for
all political parties; (3) secrecy of the ballot; (4) reason-
able speed in the counting of ballots; (5) accountability
and openness of the electoral process to the competing
parties and (6) an acceptable electoral law." 142
When applying the standard above to the election of Moham-
med Morsi, conditions become circumspect. 52% of the Egyptian
population voted in that election.143 There were delays in the polls
opening and some accounts of voter intimidation.144 There was said to
be good accessibility to the polling stations, 145 so the hindrances did
not extend to physical barriers blocking voters from access. Still,
people were witnessed to be turned away because their names were
not listed, nor were they able to provide proof of identity.146
139 Jose Colon-Rios, Can There Be a Democratic Coup d'Etat?, HILJ SYMPOSIUM
(Sept. 26, 2012, 4:00 PM).
140 Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86, A.J.I.L. 46
(1992).
141 The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 25, Dec. 16, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171.
142 Muna Ndulo, The United Nations and the Monitoring of National Elections, 23
CORNELL L. FORUM 13, 15 (1996) (citing to NAT'L DEMOCRATIC INST. FOR INT'L
AFFAIRS, NATION BUILDING: U.N. AND NAMIBIA 26 (1990)).
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The legal requirements to campaign and electoral law are
interrelated. The electoral laws that took effect after the revolution
were what allowed candidates to campaign for the presidency.147 Both
include constitutional requirements that involve citizenship, citizen-
ship of parents, and lack of criminal history.148 There were also certain
possibilities for how a candidate becomes nominated, involving parlia-
mentary endorsement being from a party that holds at least one seat in
the last election's people's council and a popular referendum from
thirty-thousand people, one thousand from each governorate. 149 In the
run up to the 2012 election, there were candidates supported by the
military and the Muslim Brotherhood. There was some doubt as to
how candidates were selected as two were precluded from the
elections on the basis that each had a criminal history, charges that
were politically motivated results of the Mubarak era.150 The trans-
parency of the electoral process, or the openness and the accountability
to the differing parties was gauged as an improvement, with more to
go.151 Still, the final candidates represented the two opposite ends of
the political spectrum and there were secular candidates as well, albeit
far less known.
The certainty of the ballot's secrecy was not firm either and
breaches were recorded at substantial polling stations. 152 Some judges
and officials provided illiterate voters with assistance, while others
claimed that this was illegal.153 Further, there was found to be "proce-
dural irregularities in counting and aggregation.154
If the key to Mohamed Morsi being a democratic leader was
that he was the winner of a free and fair election, then his status as
such may be murky. From hindrances to actual to problems with ballot
secrecy and counting, there were issues that disrupted the electoral
process.155 There seemed to be improvements in that there was an
147 Sahar Aziz, Revolution Without Reform? A Critique of Egypt's Election Laws, 45
GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REv. 101 (2012).
148 id
149 Id.
I50 See CARTER CENTER, supra note 143.
151 See Aziz, supra note 147.
152 See CARTER CENTER, supra note 143.
153 Id
154 See Aziz, supra note 147.
1Ssee CARTER CENTER, supra note 143.
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opportunity for all of the parties to fairly participate in campaigning.
Nevertheless, the country had just emerged from a revolution and had
been living under hotly contested military rule. Their readiness for an
actual election, or lack thereof, is demonstrated by the very low turn-
out. Moreover, former President Morsi's actions in the immediately
following his election further blurred his credentials. There was wide
displeasure with his lack of success in improving the economy and the
eerie resemblance of his actions to authoritarian leader, Hosni
Mubarak. 156
The military's "decisive role" in Morsi's ousting is the second
element of a potential legal obligation for the United States to discon-
tinue providing them with funds. The reaction after Morsi was ousted
were mass protests by Muslim Brotherhood supporters and they were
met with harsh violence, as scores of people were killed.157 Another
pivotal consideration is the quickness with which the military restores
power to the people via a new election. Finally there is the issue of
whether any of these conditions really matter or does the plain mean-
ing of the Foreign Assistance Act hold and the actions of the United
States is a prima facie case of unlawful support of a military coup.
Section 7008 of the 2014 Consolidated Appropriations directed
that the military needed to have had a substantial role in the coup or
decree,158and the Egyptian military likely did play that level of a role.
Political scientists, international lawyers, and other experts have been
attempting to define the term coup d'etat for centuries. It can be
defined as a political and/or military elite attempting to unseat the
existing heads of state by both coercive and unconstitutional means. 159
B. U.S Action in Egypt
The actions of Egypt's people, military, and government are
not the only ones that must be considered in the instant inquiry. In
order to ascertain whether the U.S acted in accordance with its own
156 See Sharp, supra note 131.
157 Id.
1ss Supra note 49.




FOREIGN Am IN EGYPT
laws, the FAA, the AECA, and the 2014 Consolidated Appropriations
bill, one must take into account U.S. foreign aid policy considerations
and the typical execution of these laws in similar dilemmas. Rationales
for foreign aid, if divided into three broad categories are national
security, commercial and humanitarian.160
National Security interests play a significant role in United
State foreign aid policy and have done so since the United States
emerged from World War II as a global superpower.161 From the end
of the Cold War, and especially since the attacks on September 11th,
2001, U.S. foreign aid has been focused in the Middle East, in fact the
top five recipients of U.S. foreign aid, in recent years have all been
Middle Eastern or South Asian countries, with some relationship to the
War on Terror. Egypt is one of the only two countries with a peace
treaty with Israel, our strongest ally in the region. Further, Morsi was a
member of the Muslim Brotherhood, an ally of Hamas, and is on
record denouncing Israel.
Commercial interests in Egypt are also fairly extensive. Egypt
is not only the recipient of a fair amount of aid they buy military
equipment from United States arms dealers as well.162 In 2010 Egypt
entered into an arms deal with U.S. contractor Lockheed Martin for the
purchase of 20 F-16 "Fighter Falcons", a $2.5 billion deal.163
Humanitarian concerns also justify continuing and freezing
foreign aid. The very notion of halting assistance if a coup ousts a
democracy is a form of humanitarian consideration. Morsi, shortly
after taking power, attempted to form a constitution on ideological
grounds and immunize himself from the judiciary. Critical journalists
were being arrested, religious and ideological minorities were sup-
pressed, and crime and poverty remained high. Additionally reports
have been emerging of Egypt being the country in the Middle East
where women have the worst quality of life. All of this triggered the
Tamerod movement's protests, which were even larger than those
taking place during the Mubarak era. These protests were responded
to with force and a few died before the military removed Morsi from
power.
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C. Comparative Study
Section 7008 of the Consolidated Appropriations Bill for 2014,
in accordance with the FAA, remains constant no matter the context
surrounding foreign aid disbursements. When the formula includes
the three rationales for foreign aid, context becomes very important in
understanding justifications for foreign aid policy. Comparatively, the
United States' relationship, in the context of to Egypt is closest to that
of Algeria and Pakistan. The United States response, however, was
closest to that which it had in Honduras. In all four of the above-
mentioned cases, a military interfered with the democratic process,
and United States had to balance doctrinal law and pragmatic policy in
order to take definitive action.
The facts on the ground in both coups were very similar. In
Algeria, there was a blatant interference by the Algerian military in the
electoral process, resulting from a monopolization of power by Islamist
factions, which had historically been at odds with the military.164 If the
events that conspired in Egypt, since July, 2013, were summed up into
one sentence it would likely look very similar to that of events in
Algeria in the 1990s. In accordance with the FAA, and Section 7008 for
Egypt, foreign aid was cut to Algeria. However, once the United States
had vital national security interests in Algeria and Egypt for re-
establishing and continuing foreign aid, respectively. In Algeria it was
not until the United States needed an ally in the region until President
Bush chose to reinstate foreign aid disbursements. Similarly, Egypt is
the in the center of the Arab world, has a valuable peace treaty to
maintain, and has thus far been an ally in the War on Terror.
While in Pakistan the facts on the ground can be differentiated
to those in Egypt, the FAA and the EPPA directed that the executive to
halt all assistance. United States' interests in reinstating, or continuing
aid programs, to the two countries were similar. Pakistan's near
borders Afghanistan, the site of America's longest war to date, is home
to the Pakistani Taliban, one of the United States' most prominent
international adversaries. The U.S. also has similar commercial
interests in Pakistan as it does in Egypt. Between 2002 and 2010,
1 See Fisher, supra note 96.
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Foreign Military Sales, between 2002 and 2010.165 Further, as of 2012,
the United States has provided Pakistan with $2.5 Billion in Foreign
Military Financing.166,167 Egypt has similarly been a part of the U.S.'
Foreign Military Financing programs.
In the case of Honduras, the similarities lie in both the action of
Honduras and the reactions of the United States. This is of course not
surprising as events in both Egypt and Honduras unfolded during the
Obama administration. Here, the application of the FAA is less certain
due to the facts on the ground. Honduras and Egypt both had elected
leaders that were seen to be abusing their official power and trying to
unilaterally alter their constitutions in order to expand that power.
Additionally, the United States and Honduran government had a
cooperative national security relationship, as Egypt was an asset in the
Middle East, Honduras was an ally in the Western Hemisphere for
policing narcotics traffickers.168 In a similar manner, the Obama
administration was careful not to characterize either of the incidents as
a coup, so as not to implicate Section 7008. And again, eventually both
of these countries did have some of its aid cut off.
V. CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS
The United States' continued support of the Egyptian military
subsequent to Mohamed Morsi's ouster is likely to be considered
lawful by courts from the Supreme Court of the United States to the
International Court of Justice. The gaps in the text of the Foreign
Assistance Act are filled by policy driven subsequent legislation and
executive action, allowing for its malleable interpretation. In this way,
U.S. foreign aid can be both lawful and serve United States interests
based on the relevant circumstances. And perhaps more importantly
the United States did eventually freeze most Egyptian foreign aid until
a time that the President determines free and fair elections have taken
place.169
165 Major US. Arm Sales and Grants to Pakistan in 2001, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH
SERVICE (July 25, 2012) http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/196190.pdf.
166 Id
167 Foreign Military Financing entails U.S. loans to a government to purchase weapons.
168 See Malkin, supra note 116.
169 See Sharp, supra note 131.
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The mandate of the FAA is to promote democratic institutions
and even with the repeal of Section 508, provisions abound directing
the President and relevant institutions to freeze aid should recipient
countries show a lack of complicity with those aims. 170 Statutes,
throughout Title 22 fill in the gaps left by the broad and grandiose
terms of the FAA, some designating aid for humanitarian purposes,
some commercial and some for national security. Any doubt as to the
purpose of the FAA and United States foreign aid programs, is extin-
guished by Section 7008 of the 2014 Consolidated Appropriations Bill,
mandating the suspension of foreign aid upon a military playing a
substantial role in the coup' d'etat of a democratically elected leader.171
Mohamed Morsi was likely not the democratic leader that
would implicate an immediate suspension of foreign aid, rendering
anything less, on the part of the Obama administration, unlawful. His
democratic mandate was hazy at best due to low voter turnout, hin-
drances to those who did vote, and ballot difficulties.172 What is more,
once in office Morsi acted as an authoritarian leader and the country
saw renewed protests larger than those under Mubarak, with many
deeming the revolution not to have ended.173 This made it seem as
though the military was carrying out the will of the people. In this
respect, the closest similarities to the Egyptian coup is to Honduras
rather than Algeria, Niger, and Pakistan. That being due to the clear
military incursion on the democratic will of Algerians, Nigeriens, and
Pakistanis, whereas in Honduras the President had been acting
unilaterally to subvert the Constitution in a way that was similar to
Morsi. And, this allowed for the continuance, in both situations, of aid
disbursements.
Those opposed to continued aid, likely sympathetic to the
Muslim Brotherhood, would point to the language of the FAA,
claiming Morsi was democratically elected, thus precluding continued
financial assistance. The "Tamarod Movement" would strongly consi-
der the events of July 3rd, 2013 a second revolution, with the military
supporting the popular will. Morsi's actions in manipulating the
constitution, and deteriorating civil conditions, including a escalating
170 22 U.S.C. § 2151 (2014).
171 Supra note 49.
172 See Aziz, supra note 147.
173 See Sharp, supra note 131.
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crime ratel74 breathe a lot of life into this claim. Further, the United
States did suspend aid to the Egyptian military as conditions deteriora-
ted,175 thus lending credence to the claim that the United States acted
according to the law, and was merely attempting to decipher the
complex situation.
The continued funding to Egypt presents curious implications
for foreign aid programs in the future and the aims that these laws
attempt to accomplish. It is largely beyond dispute that continued
assistance to Egypt, as well as other States, is affected more by policy
considerations rather than the legal ones. Through subsequent appro-
priations bills and unilateral executive action, the United States gov-
ernment can accomplish quick changes in the law, to suit the present
need. Practically, in a world that is constantly evolving, this is largely
an inescapable outcome of geopolitics. However, if one buys into the
theory of international relations that democratic governments share
interest and thus have more mutually beneficial political and economic
relationships, a comprehensive "foreign aid" bill may serve more long
term purposes for the United States. Legislation should enshrine in law
both the responsibility to promote democracy around the world and
discourage military dictatorships. It should include reservations, such
as only suspending government-to-government aid so, if possible,
money can still reach populations that need it and provisions that
address national security risks as well. Sovereignty and democracy to
are two values that the United States claims to support; and that
support could grow stronger if protected in comprehensive legislation.
174 See Sharp, supra note 33.
175 See Sharp, supra note 131.
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